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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. 1; Whether the district court erred infindingthere is an
applicable public policy in the State of Utah that can provide the basis for creation of a
new tort in Utah for wrongful termination of employment in violation of a public policy
against discrimination based upon sex that is applicable against small employers.
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of whether the district court
correctly applied applicable law. upon which the district court's determination is afforded
no deference. E.g., Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers. 2001 UT 32. c 11.23 P.3d 1022.
1025-26 (2001) (-Whether a clear and substantial public policy exists supporting a
wrongful discharge claim based on an employer's violation of [public] polio, is a
question of law."*): Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. 2000 LT 18. r 4. 994
P.2d 1261. 1263 (2000) ("Review of a trial coun's grant of summan judgment includes
a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied governing law. affording no
deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of law.")
Demonstration that Issue No. 1 was Preserved in the District Court:
This issue of the existence of an applicable public policy upon which the claimed New
Ton could be created in Utah was one of the principal arguments briefed and argued by

-1 -

Defendants in the district court. i£ g Record, p.""'2i 1 (" "Motion oi De^aoant for
Summan' Judgment" hereinafter. "Defendants' Motion1); Record pp. "5 and 85-94
(""Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summan' Judgment' and
in Support of the "Motion of Defendant for Summan' Judgment '

hereinafter.

"Defendants' Initial Summary Judgment Memorandum )).

Issue No. 2: Whether the district court erred in finding that the Utah Antii;^crimination Act (tn*
aciiu:

,

c

™r ^eemr* cannon o; a new ton cause of

Muni.... i-riiimiaiioii ui ernpu

.. ..

t.

runik (HHIC> agair^i

eiiiplo} ees.
Standard of Review: Iliis issue is a question of whether the distric:

t

correctly applied applicable law. upon which the district court's determination o aiiorucu
r.o deference. E.g.. Burton v. Exam Or. Inuu.y d; Lcn. Men. C.:n:c. 2000 I T i;'. * .
oo.« n

->A

i^f]

^rr

/^00)

DemonstratiOD that Issue No. 2 was Preserved in the District Court:
I his issue ot I ' : \ D - \ s pi eei i lptioi i c f tl le claimed new tort was one oi me r n n c p j ;
iiiiiririi". hneffil and AVIWCA I-- 1 ldi*nduiii% u iln libliia i nHiii i/ L' Kctord |

Memorandum)).

1

Issue No. 3: Whether, as a matter of law. supervisory or other employees
can be held directly and personally liable for the new tort of wrongful termination of
employment in violation of a public polio.- against discrimination based upon sex.
assuming there is a basis for creation of the new ton in Utah. and. therefore, whether the
district court erred in ruling further discover}' was necessary to rule upon the issue of
Defendant Kelly Peterson's direct personal liability for the claimed new ton.
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of whether the district court
correcth applied applicable law. upon which the district coun's determination is afforded
no deference. E.g., Burton v. Exam Or. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. 2000 LT 18. c 4.
994 P.2d 1261.1263(2000).
Demonstration that Issue No. 3 was Preserved in the District Court:
This issue of direct personal liability for the claimed tort was one of the principal
arguments briefed and argued by Defendants in the district court. i£.g.. Record, p. "2
»Defendants" Motion): Record, pp. 75-76. 94-98 (Defendants" Initial Summan Judgment
Memorandum)).

Issue No. 4: Whether the district court erred b> entering an Order not in
conformity with its underlying Opinion since the Order appears to strike the affirmative
defenses that there is no direct personal liability for the claimed ton whereas the
inder:> ing Opinion expressly reserved ruling upon the issue of personal liability".

Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law upon which the
district court's determination i* afforded no aeference. E.g.. Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus.
& Gen. Med. Clinic. 2000 L 1 . S . f ;. - i ; P.2d 1261. 1263 (2000).
Demonstration that Issue No. 4 was Preserved in the District Court:
This issue of the Order exceeding the scope of the district court's Opinion was preserved
in the district coun by virtue of Defendants" "Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed •Order."""
1

' ich objectet1 ', '' , Order us not being in conformity with •'

s Opinion.

i Record, pp >
. I « i 11> >

ULlfcKMLNAUV L CONSTITUTIONAL fliUVISIONS.

S 1 A 1 I I LS.

RULES. AND REGULATIONS
It is Defendants-Appellants" contention that the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act's small employer exemption provision ; ^iah Code .Ann. § 34A-5-102(8Haxivl
• Supp. 2001 n i- dispositive of this case, particularly in conjunction with the Act's
exclusive remedy provision ! id 5? ?4 A.--" -1 -~ ; ~., Tories of those provisions ire
included in . \Cue: ,,^,
A"
rule-

•,-.. n.-i.

' '!u !,>'!<"' : L1 ,.,.1 '!,,: ' .ii'.ou-, •. ,MI^I:!.niriui! ;",' M-:OUS. -aaiuies.

.no, rcjulaiums llnl I'l nniil'l • \pprlkv rued in lhi nru ivdmi^ below the

interrreiation anil application el ulm'li hr.ir 'iron This appeal

Due TO Milium1 ill ill,1

following are included in numerical order in the respective addenda :o mis onci da
follows;

Constitutional Provisions - Addendum No. 4
Utah Constitution Article I. Sections 1 and 24 (1991)

Utah Statutes - Addendum No. 5
Utah Code Ann. § 11-25-12 (1999)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1. -3 (1999)
Utah Code Ann. § 26-8A-501 (1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-3. -5. -6. -7 (2000)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1996)

Utah Administrative Rnles - Addendum No. 6
Utah Admin. Code R199-8-3 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R277-112-3 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R277-911-3 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R432-200-7 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R432-270-5 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R432-550-7 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R432-700-8 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R432-750-7 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R477-2-3 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R512-10-3 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R54"r-2-16 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R547-4-16 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R590-76-6 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R590-83 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R606-3-2 (2001}
Utah Admin. Code R686-103-7 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R986-100-107 (2001)
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-107 (2001)

Utah Executive Orders - Addendum No. 7
Utah Exec. Order. March 17. 1993 (Governor Leavitt)

uv; vet. Order, .one :•> . 4K9 (GovernorBangerten
v.~ii- Lxec. Order. iui\ .... . tJ 86 (Governor Bangeneri
Utah Exec. Order. May 28. 1985 (Governor Bangerter)
Utah Exec. Order. Jam., sn
982 (Governor Matheson)
J
Utah Exec. Order. Juh
*i •. Jovernor Matheson)
u
Utah Exec. Order. Ma\ i : ~9 (Governor Matheson)
Utah Exec. Order ! »c:or>er i . °"" (Governor Matheson)
Utah Exec. Order. December t>. 19""? (Governor Rampton)
Utah Exec. Order. October 1 u en (Governor Rampton)

Federal Statutes - Addendum No. 8
2 U.S.C. §1311(2001)
3 U.S.C. §411(2001)
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2001)
42 U.S.C. §2000e (2001)
42 U.S.C. §5057(200 )

Federal Regulations - Addendum No. 9
23 C.F.R.
41 C.F.R.
4" C.F.R.
49 C.F.R.

§230.113(2001)
§ 60-1.4 (2001)
§73.2080(2001)
§ 265.7(aX 1 )(!•• 2™' x

ST A l l \\\ .1 OK M1L( ASE
A. Nature of the Case
Thk
brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Toby Gottling (Plaintiff") against both her former
employer. Defendant-Appellant P.R. Incorporated, and aga:r.>: her • —.- - ~c- •

- o-

personally. Defendant-Appellant Kelly Peterson. Plaintiff could not state a claim for
relief under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act or Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964 since P.R- Incorporated employed fewer than the fifteen employees required for
liability. Plaintiff therefore asked the district coun to create a new tort never before
recognized in the State of Utah: wrongful termination of employment in violation of a
public policy against discrimination based on sex (the "New Tort"). The Plaintiff then
asked the district court to award Plaintiff damages, including punitive damages, against
both the business P.R. Incorporated and personally against her former supenisor. Kelly
Peterson.
B. Course of Proceeding
The Defendants answered in the lawsuit generally denying Plaintiffs
claims of any termination based in any way upon or related to sex or sexual
discrimination, asserted various affirmative defenses, and set forth legitimate, nonpretexruai business reasons for which Plaintiffs employment was terminated.

Initially Plaintiff sued onh Kelly Peterson, her former supervisor, personally.
\See Record p. 1 (Plaintiffs original "Complaint")). Only during the parties* briefing of
their respective cross-motions for summary judgment did Plaintiff seek leave of the
district coun to amend her complaint to add P.R. Incorporated as a defendant in this case.
>See Record, p. 1"5 (Plaintiffs "Motion to .Amend Complaint**)). Plaintiff was granted
'.eave to amend as a pan of the district coun"s Order (Order.r 4). PlaintifThas filed a
'Second .Amended Complaint"" now the operative complaint in this case, naming P.R.
incorporated as a defendant. This granting of leave to amend and the amendment are
noted for background onh but are not a pan of what Defendants are asking this Coun to
review in this appeal.

Plaintiff and Defendants each filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
and various other motions related thereto that are not at issue in this appeal/
In Defendants" Motion for summary judgment Defendants sought
dismissal of Plaintiff s claims on rvvo principal bases. First that Plaintiffs claimed New
Ton does not and can not exist in Utah because the only applicable public policy in Utah
regarding 'employment discrimination based on sex is that of the Utah AntiDi sci i mination Act (the I J X D \ ) vhich this Court has recognized expressly exempts

Mthough 1 MemiaiH P R Incorporated technically was not a party to this case
during the proceedings on summary* judgment. PR, Incorporated has joined in and
adopted all of the arguments set forth by Defendant Kelly Peterson in support of his
u:r:rrar\ :udgment motion and in opposition to Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment.
In \is Or>mion the district court mis-stated Defendants" argument on that point.
The a;: tr.; coun stated: "Defendant urges that there is no support in Utah tor Plaintiffs
.uibc /:\is.i:on for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy." 1 Opinion, p.
21. To the contrary. Defendants concede that there is an exception to \.'i3h'< "at-wilF
employment doctrine by which an employer may be held liable for terminating an
employee in violation of a recognized public policy. (E.g., Record pp. 85-86
(Defendants * Initial Summary Judgment Memorandum 11 Defendants" argument, rather, is
that the purported public policy1" against discrimination based on sex being claimed b> the
Plaintiff in this case has never been recognized as. a public policy upon which a cause ot
action lor \\ rongful termination may be based. 'The Defendants further araie thai ^
virtue of the I ADA. the Utah legislature has preempted recognition of such punx>neu
poiicy is giving rise to a cognizable claim, particularly as agam>t small empiowrs \\\±
fewer than fifteen employees such as Plaintiff- former employer r> [? Incorporated.
admittedly is in this case, '.SCL •. 'j . .**• ai pp v'*- <a
-8-

Incorporated, and not by Kelly Peterson who therefore did not personally terminate her
employment and was not personally subject to any duty upon which the claimed ton of
wrongful termination of employment is premised.
In Plaintiffs "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" ("Plaintiffs
Motion"). Plaintiff sought to strike both the Defendants* affirmative defenses under the
UADA and the defense that Kelly PetersQn cannot be held personally liable for the
claimed New Tort since Plaintiff was not employed by Kelly Peterson personally.
There were no disputes of any material fact that would preclude summary
judgment for Defendants. Rather, the only issues before the coun were purely issues of
law as to the existence and scope of liability for the claimed New Tort
C. Disposition of the District Court
On February 20. 2001. the district court heard oral arguments from both
counsel of record on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and other matters not
rele\ant to this appeal. (E.g.. Transcript, p.2 ("Oral .Argument Decision Hearing." filed
with the district court but not number indexed by it as of the time of this writing). The
district court took the matter under advisement. (Id. at pp.33-34).
At a second hearing held March 20. 2001. the district court delivered to
counsel a "Memorandum Decision" (hereinafter, the "Opinion"). In its Opinion, a copy
of tthich is attached hereto as a part of Addendum No. 1. the district coun. among other
things not relevant to this appeal, denied Defendants" Motion and panially granted

-9-

Plaintiffs Motion, striking Defendants* affirmative defenses 'under the UADA and
creating the claimed New Tort but expressly reserving for future ruling the issue of direct
personal liability of Defendant Kelly Peterson.
The district conn's subsequent Order, drafted by Plaintiffs counsel at the
district court's request a copy of which is attached hereto as part of Addendum W
confirmed the court's creation of the New Tort and then went beyond the court's
i

" • 1} mg Opinion. Specifically, whereas the Opinion expressly granted Plaintiff s
iononi} in par,

defenses thp* v

..jncomp..:.'.

•-

*

^

Tort (affirmative defenses nos. 2 and 3 of "the Answ er) whereas the Opinion express!)
granted Plaintiffs Motion only "with respect to affirmative defenses four and Ii\c
relating to the I * A DA. (Compare Record, p ~.";

."

.;; Record, p 295

(Opinion)).
tXiwiiua-its tiled an,. •. -injection to iMamnii - Proposed "Order."'* objecting
i t lat i 1 le Or dei gi ai itii lg Plaii itif 1: s Moti< >i I " it hout lii nitation or exception is not in
» onliirniii' uitli iilin i nuri

< ipinwm

JIIIIII

i iiiiiih i I i ill1 mum Ml in vuili .jiiuihu poiinm

L^/7.yuTc * i oi die urder iAuucndum No. I hereto; nun

*• •-. *

how ever, entered the Order o\ er Defendants" objection, and indeed before the time
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allowed under the applicable rules to object to the proposed Order had elapsed.
D. Statement of Facts
Each of the following facts were set forth in Defendants" Initial Summary
Judgment Memorandum (at the pages of the Record indicated below > and were
undisputed by Plaintiff. Each of the following facts, therefore, are deemed admitted and
established for purposes of this case. See Utah R. Judicial Admin. 4-50H2XB).
1.

Kelly Peterson is the President of P.R. Incorporated, a Utah

corporation in good standing. (Record, p. 79: see also Record, p. 114. c 3 of the
"Affidavit of Kelly Peterson" (hereinafter, the "Peterson Affidavit")).
2.

Plaintiff was hired by P.R. Incorporated db/a Carbmaster on or

about Juh- 27.2000 by Kelly Peterson in his capacity as president of P.R. Incorporated.
(Record, p. 80: Record, p. 114 (Peterson Affidavit c 6)).
3.

Plaintiffs employment with P.R. Incorporated was one of an at-will

empie>ee. (Record, p. 80: Record, p.l 14 (Peterson Affidavit c c 7. 9. & 10n.
4.

Kelly Peterson did not personally in his individual capacit} emplo>

PlainurT. (Record, p. 80: Record, p.l 14 (Peterson Affidavit r l 1)).
5.

Plaintiff, in every instance, was paid b> the corporation P.R.

Incorporated. Kelly Peterson did not. in his individual capacity, pay Plaintiff any wages.
• Record, pp. 80-81: Record, pp.114-15 (Peterson Affidavit cc12-14ii.
6.

P.R. Incorporated made required federal and stale wiihhoidings on
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Plaintiffs \\ages and properly paid the same. Keiiy Peterson individually did not.
iRctuiii p. 81; Record p.i ;f Peterson Affida\ it € 15)).
P.R. Incorporated took an appropriate tax deduction for payment of
Plamulf b wages and related withholdings. Kelly Peterson individually did not (Record
p 81. Record, p 115 (Peterson Affidavit r 16 >)
8

P R Incorporated maintains bank accounts totally separate and

di stinct from Kelh' Peterson s personal uiu, .*u»*

ink accounts ( R ecord p 81:

R ecoi d p.i 15 If 'eterson-\i:.,»*
9

I Lei

1 VitTson Affidavit c l8)K

persona 1 bills <
iu.

HII ued s i none? i :: pa:;; h i s

i .ix. liicorporated has not 'used Kelly Peterson's persuiicu money to

pa> its bills or obligations. (Record p. 81: Record p. 115 (Peterson Affidavit r 19)).
~ R. Incorporated 'files separate tax returns each \ ear.< Re;. *rc ,
81: Record p.i 15 (Peterson Affidavit r201).
' .12

P R. incorporated has a business office located at a wnou* anferenL

separate, and distinct address from Kelly I Person's home address. (Record, p 81
Recoi d i \ 11 5 (I *eters< :n i • X ff id a1 'it € 21 )}
1'"

V I*! Im prpouird In*, A ruMnc^ i:\cph\mv mimhT ih.ti i. ""UiH!"\

different separate, and distinct from Kelly Peterson's personal telephone number.
* Record p. 82. : 15: Record, p. w_ ,iVia^on Affida\n* 22 ii.

14.

Any business license applied for by P.R. Incorporated db.a.

Carbmaster (the name of the business where Plaintiff was employed) was applied for by
Kelly Peterson in his representative capacity as president and agent of P.R. Incorporated.
(Record, p. 82: Record p. 115 (Peterson Affidavit r 23)).
15.

In his sole capacity as president of P.R. Incorporated Kelly Peterson

asked Toby Gottling not to come to work for P.R. Incorporated because it was his belief,
in his capacity as president of P.R. Incorporated she had improperly taken money, had
lied about her whereabouts, had lied aboui her past, and could no longer be trusted.
(Record p. 82: Record p. 116 (Peterson Affidavit r 24)).
16.

P.R. Incorporated is not a volunteer organization that receives

financial assistance from the federal government. P.R. Incorporated is a small private
automobile mechanic and repair shop. (Record p. 82: Record p. 116 (Peterson Affidavit
c

25)>.
17.

P.R. Incorporated does not contract work from or with the federal

go\eminent. (Record p. 82: Record, p. 116 (Peterson Affida\it r261).
18.

P.R. Incorporated is a small auto mechanic shop having onl> fi\e

emplo>ees. Defending against this lawsuit has cost Kelly Peterson thousands of dollars in
legal expense, has caused significant disruption in the business of P.R. Incorporated and
has caused significant disruption of personal relationships with the emplo>ees at P.R.
Incorporated. (Record p. 82: Record, p. 116 (Peterson Affida\it r 2"u.
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19.

In Plaintiffs Motion Plaintiff sought to eliminate the second third

fourth and fifth of Defendants* affirmative defenses, the second and third relating to
personal liability of Kelly Peterson, and the third and fourth relating to UADA
preemption. In its Opinion the district court expressly granted Plaintiffs Motion only
"with respect to affirmative defenses four and five."* The district court expressly held in
its Opinion that it was going to "hold off reaching a decision** on the personal liability
issue pending further discovery. In the language of the proposed Order, however, that
was drafted by Plaintiff and circulated for review on March 20.2001. granted Plaintiffs
Motion without limitation of any kind thus apparently eliminating all four of the
affirmative defenses attacked by Plaintiff including the personal liability defenses.
Defendants timely filed an objection to the proposed Order on that basis on March 27.
2001. On March 28.2001. however, over Defendants" objection, the district court
entered the Order, including the unlimited grant of PlaintifTs Motion as to ail four
affirmative defenses attacked. (Record, p. 15 (Plaintiffs Motion): Record p. 295
(Opinioni: Record p. 318 c 1 (Order): Record p. 313 ("Objection io PlaintifTs Proposed
"Order*"): see also Record p. 9 (Answer)).
20.

The Order's apparent elimination of the affirmative defenses of

personal liability in granting Plaintiffs Motion is internally inconsistent with that ponion
of the Order stating reserving ruling on Defendants' Motion as it pertained to personal
liability pending further discovery. (Compare Record p. 318 r 3 v. :th r 11 Order)).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in creaiing the New Ton and in holding that the
New Ton is cognizable against supervisory employees personally. There simply is no
legal support for the creation of the claimed New Tort in Utah. To the contrary, as this
Court recently confirmed in the case of Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med Clinic.
2000 LT 18.994 P.2d 1261 (2000). the UADA statutorily exempts small employers from
employment discrimination claims and preempts such claims against small employers,
thus foreclosing as a matter of law creation of the claimed New Tort as the district court
did. Second even if the New Tort could exist in Utah, as a matter of law Kelly Peterson
could not be held personally liable for it because by definition only an employer can be
liable for wrongful termination of employment (the core of the claimed New Tort) and
Kelly Peterson was not Plaintiffs employer.
It is important to note at the outset that the summary judgment proceedings
beiow dealt only with whether the New Ton could exist in Utah as a matter of law and
the scope of such New Ton. Plaintiff did not claim in the summary judgment
proceedings that there had in fact been any wrongful termination of employmenL did not
set fonh am claimed facts from which the district court could consider an> such claim at
:hai eari} stage of the case, and did not ask the district court to find a wrongful
termination in fact occurred. Nor could Plaintiff prevail upon any such claim at the
summan judgment stage since Defendants affirmatively denied under oath that

Plaintiffs termination was in any way related to her sex. and stated instead that
Plaintiffs termination was for identified legitimate business reasons. Whether there had
in fact been any wrongful termination simply was not before the district court below and
is not before this Court on appeal.
All the district court ruled upon, and thus the only issues before this Court
arc the legal issues of whether the claimed New Tort can exist as a viable cause of action
in Utah, and the scope of such New Tort if it can exist. As a matter of law. the district
court was incorrect on both counts and should be reversed. Both the recognition of the
Sew Ton itself and the imposition of personal liability upon Kelly Peterson for such
New Ton are unsupported by. and indeed contrary to. applicable law. This Court
therefore should reverse the district court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED NEW TORT. WHICH WAS
CREATED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. IS WITHOUT
FOUNDATION, IS PREEMPTED BY UTAH STATUTE. AND IS
CONTRARY TO RECENT RULINGS OF THIS COURT
The district court's creation of the claimed New Tort was improper and

shouid he reversed because both the Plaintiff and the district court failed to establish the
existence of a narrowly tailored, clear and substantial public policy as to why the New
Ton shouid appl> to small employers such as P.R. Incorporated. Establishment of such
public poiicy is necessary under the governing law in Utah as the foundation uron which
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to premise the claimed New Ton. Moreover, the distria couns creation of the New Ton
is directly contran' to this Couns recent ruling in the dispositive case ofBurton v. Exam
Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. 2000 UT 18.994 P2d 1261 (2000). This case, in
addressing the parallel context of age discrimination, held that the UADA. with its
fifteen employee threshold for imposing liability, statutorily preempts and precludes
claims such as the claimed New Ton being brought against employers like P.R.
Incorporated with fewer than fifteen employees. This Coun should reverse the distria
court's decision- and hold that as a matter of law the New Ton does not. and indeed
cannot exist in Utah.
There is no dispute, and indeed Plaintiff acknowledges, that Utah is an "atwill" employment state, where both the employee and the employer can terminate an
emplo}Tnent relationship at any time for any reason, or for no reason, subject to very
narrow exceptions. E.g., Ryan v. Dan s Food Stores. Inc.. 9~2 P.2d 395. 400 (Utah
1998). The only exception to her admitted "at-will" emplo>ment status that Plaintiff
claimed in this case was the one prohibiting termination of emplo} ees in violation of a
public polic>. Plaintiff asked the district coun to create, and in its Opinion and Order the
district court did create, a New Tort by finding there is a public policy against
terminating an employee on the basis of sex that is applicable to small emplo> ers.
Although there is an exception to Utah's "at-will** emplo>ment doctrine
which proscribes termination of employment in violation of a recognized public policy.

- 17-

this Court has stressed: "This notion of 'public policy" is far narrower than what may
typically be characterized as a public policy." Id at 405. Accordingly, this Court has
held:
We have recognized the importance of keeping the scope of the public
policy exception narrow to avoid unreasonably eliminating employer
discretion in discharging employees. This court "will narrowh construe
the public policies" which might be used to support a public polio claim.
We have stated that The public policy exception applies in this state when
the statutory language expressing the public conscience is clear and when
the affected interests of society are substantial.** We reiterate today that
onrv clear and substantial public policies will support a claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. [Id (quoting Peterson v. Browning.
832 P.2d 1280. 1282 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added)].
In order to create the claimed New Tort therefore, it must be shown not
only that there is a general public policy against discrimination in employment on the
basis of sex. but also that the public policy is clear, substantial and narrowly tailored by
the Utah legislature4 to apply to the situation at issue in the lawsuit. In the case at bar.
Plaintiff was employed by P.R. Incorporated which admittedly is a small business that
employs only five employees. In order to validly create the New Tort claimed in this

This Court has repeatedly held that declarations of public policy that can support
a claim for wrongful termination generally must be found in Utah's statutes or
constitution. E.g.. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280. 1283 (Utah 1992). Utah courts
may enunciaie public policy only "in areas in which the legislature has not treated."
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033. 1043 (Utah 1989). .As will be shown
below, the Utah legislature has already treated the area of employment discrimination in
the UAD.A. including expressly stating therein that the UADA is "the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based upon ... sex ....'" Utah Code .Ann. §
34A-5-10"( 15) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). Judicial enunciation of public polio, in
ihis area, therefore, is expressly preempted and precluded.
-18-

case. then, it would have to be established not only that there is a general public policy
proscribing discrimination in employment based on sex. but also that such public policy
was specifically and narrowly tailored and intended by the Utah legislature to apply to
small employers. Such a showing is legally impossible because the applicable
legislative!} -enacted public policy in Utah is that of the UADA- which exempts from
liability-, including tort liability, employers like P.R. Incorporated with fewer than 15
employees ("small employers"). See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-102(8XaXiv) (Supp.
2001) (defining "employer" subject to the provisions of the UADA as including only
entities "employing 15 or more employees"). The district court therefore erred in
creating the New Tort.
This Court's recent decision in Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen, Med.
Clinic. 2000 I T 18. 994 P.2d 1261 (2000). which addresses the parallel context of age
discrimination, shows the district court"s creation of the New Tort in the case at bar was
improper and should be reversed. The plaintiff in Burton had been terminated from his
empio>Tnent with an empiover that had fewer than fifteen employees. He sued arguing
that the court should create a new ton remed} for him: to wit. wrongful termination of
empio>ment in violation of public policy against discrimination based on age-precisely
the same ton Plaintiff is seeking to create except that it was based in the context of age
discrimination rather than sex discrimination as alleged in this case. Id. at 1264. The
tnai court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the UADA
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preempts any common law cause of action against smaii employers for tortious wrongful
termination. Id at 1263.
This Court in Burton upheld summary judgment for the defendant finding
the U.ADA* s exemption of small employers from the statutory ban on discrimination to
be an "inseparable" part of the legislative policy embodied in the UADA. and that
whatever the UADA may have done as far as setting a public policy for large employers:
We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public policy winch is
"clear and substantial*" with respect to small employers.... Our legislature
has made [the] decision to prohibit age discrimination in the termination of
employees onlv bv large employers and, if as Burton contends, small
employers should be likewise prohibited, that is a matter that the
legislature, not the court should address. [Id. at 1265-66 (emphasis
added)].
Declining the plaintiffs request to create a new tort against small
emplo} ers. this Court further quoted with approval the following:
we conclude that there presently exists no "fundamental policy" which
precludes age discrimination by a small employer. Thus, there is no
independent basis for an action for tortious discharge in violation of polio".
[Id. at 1265 (quoting Jennings v. Marraile. 8*"6 P.2d 1074. 1076 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994)].
In holding that the Utah Legislature's insulation of small employers from
Habiiit} under the UADA also precludes and preempts tort actions against small
empio> ers. this Court explained:
"Ii would be unreasonable to expect empiovers who are expressly
exempted from the [U.ADA] ban on age discrimination to nonetheless
reaiize that they must comply with the law from which they are exempted
jnder pain of possible tort liability. We do not ascribe such a purpose to
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the Legislature." [W]e would be no more justified in creating a ton action
to lie against small employers than we would be to create a tort action
against religious organizations or associations, which are also expressly
exempted from the provisions of the UADA. [Id. at 1267 (again quoting
Jennings) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)].
The UADA's small employer exemption applies to all forms of
discrimination enumerated by the UADA. including specifically based on age. as was at
issue in Burton, and based on sex as is at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Burton
reasoning regarding the small employer exemption and preemption applies with equal
force to this case. The clear and substantial public policy of the State of Utah, adopted
by the legislature in the UADA and recognized by this Court in Burton, is that tort
actions for discriminatory wrongful termination of employment are statutorily preempted
as against employers with fewer than 15 employees.
The fact that the discrimination alleged in Burton was age discrimination
whereas the discrimination alleged in this case is based on sex is of no moment. The
basis of the alleged discrimination was not controlling in Burton, nor is it controlling
under the UADA. Rather, the dispositive issue in Burton was whether small employers
ma>. as a matter of law under the U.ADA, be subject to liability for employment
discrimination claims. What Burton stands for and confirms is that the U.ADA exempts
and preempts small emplo> ers from liability for such claims due to the legislative public
policy determination embodied therein expressly exempting them from liability. Burion.
2000 I T 1 8 . r c 11-12. 994 P.2d at 1265-66. In Burton, this Court reserved judgment as
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to the potential viability of a cause of action against small employers based upon alleged
sex discrimination and other types of discrimination that were not there directly at issue.
Burton 2000 UT 18 r ? 994 P.2d at 1267. This Court stated, however, that an appropriate
and applicable public policy sufficient to meet the exception to Utah's "at-will"*
employment doctrine {i.e.. clear, substantial, and narrowly tailored) would have to be
found for a claim to be recognized particularly over the express small employer
exemption to such claims embodied in the UADA. Id The very- heart of this case is that
Plaintiff and the district court failed to identify any such public policy. This Court
therefore should reverse the district court's ruling that such a claim exists.
A.

Nothing Relied Upon by the District Court in This Case Supports
Creation of the Claimed New Tort
The district court in this case erred in creating the claimed New Tort in

contravention of the UADA's small employer exemption and preemption of tort claims
as recognized by this Court in Burton. The district court cited three public policy bases
as support for its creation of the claimed New Ton: (1) the Utah Civil Rights Act. Utah
Code § 13-"-l. which is an inapplicable statute unrelated to the employment rights that
are at issue in this case, which the district court raised sua sponte. and which was not
argued nor briefed b\ any of the parties: (2) ten executive orders from various Utah
governors which Plaintiff had cited to but which on their face and pursuant to the briefed
and undisputed governing law do not and legally cannot create public policy for the
pri\ate sector, and: (3) Title VII of the federal Civil Ri°hts Act oi :964.42 U.S.C. $
-»->

2000e (commonh' known, and hereinafter referred to. as "Title YTT) which Plaintiff had
cited but which on its face and in its legislative history and interpreting case law
indispumbly expressly exempts small employers from liability* just like the UADA. None
of these sources declares a clear and substantial public policy against employment
discrimination that when narrowly construed as required by this Court's precedent
would support the creation of the claimed New Tort against small employers such as P.RIncorporated.
1.

The Utah Civil Rights Act is Inapplicable to This Case Because it
Provides Only for Customers Equal Access to Goods and Services:
It is Not an Employment Rights Statute and Therefore is
Inapplicable to This Employment Case

The lower court sua sponte and without opportunity for research and
briefing by the parties, determined that the Utah Civil Rights Act established a public
polic\ prohibiting affecting rights with respect to termination of employment. On its
face, however, the Utah Civil Rights Act (Utah Code Ann. $ 13-7-1 (1999) - a copy of
which is included in Addendum No. 5 hereto n is clearh inapplicable to this case and is
not an appropriate foundation upon which the claimed New Tort can be based. The Utah
Civil Rights Act expressly states that its "purpose is to assure all citizens full and equal
availability of all goods, services, and facilities offered by business establishments and
places of public accommodation." Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (1999). Since the express
goal of the Act is to ensure non-discriminatory availability of goods and sen ices, it is
clear ;he Ci\il Rights Act deals with relationships and actions between businesses and

the public at large. Its public policy goal is to ensure customers can shop in and be
served at stores, restaurants, hotels, hospitals, and so on without discrimination. It
manifestly does not apply to or grant any employment rights which are whai are at issue
in this case. The Civil Rights Act therefore is not a "clear and substantial" public policy
statement regarding employment rights that when narrowly construed as this Court's
precedents require, can create a New Tort for wrongful termination of employment
This Court's analysis in Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers. 2001 UT 32.23
P.3d 1022 (2001). is highly instructive on this point The issue in Rackley was whether
termination of the plaintiffs employment with an elder care facility for informing a
resident of the arrival at the facility of a certain check payable to the resident despite
instructions from superiors not to so inform the resident violated public policy protecting
residents*rightsto manage their financial affairs. Id

cc

9 & 10.23 P.3d at 1025. In

support of such public policy claim the plaintiff relied upon .Article I. section 1 of the
Utah Constitution, which states that "[a]ll men have the inherent and inalienable right to
. . . acquire, possess and protect property . . . . " There are very few rights more
fundamental than the right to acquire, possess and protect one's own property.
Ne\ertheless. this Court held that right was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the claim
at issue and thus could not provide the basis for a tort claim for wrongful termination in
uolaticn of public policy, explaining:
The right of a care facility resident to manage her own funds [which was
±e public policy claim at issue in Rackley] is not "plainly defined b> . . .
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[these] constitutional standards." [Id. at c 20.23 P.2d ai 1028 {quoting
Ryan v. Dan s Food Stores. Inc.. 972 P.2d 395.405 (Utah 1998))].
The Utah Civil Rights Act does not apply in the case at bar for the same
reason. The public policy claimed by Plaintiff is one of discrimination in employment.
The Utah Civil Rights Act however, simph does not "plainly define." nor indeed deal at
all with, any employment-related rights. It therefore does not establish the narrow type
of policy required by this Court's precedent upon which to base a tort claim for wrongful
termination of employment, particularly not to circumvent the small employer exemption
of the UADA that is specifically an employment statute.
a.

Legislative History Confirms the Utah Civil Rights Act is
Not Intended to Apply to Employment Rights, and Thus
Does Not Apply to This Case

The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act further confirms that Act is
limited in scope and simply does not apply outside of business-customer relations, and
thus does not apply to employer-employee relations. During the floor debates on the
Civil Rights Act. Representative Poulson. the floor sponsor, ^as mice asked about its
intended scope. Both times he responded that the Utah Civil Rights Act would appiy
only to ensure customer access to places of public accommodation such as hotels, motels.
restaurants, boarding houses and other businesses. See Utah State House of
Representatives. Floor Debate on Senate Bill 44. February 4. 1965. 25th Day. Record 4.
Side 1 at 12-20:26. Representative Poulson indicated the legislature was working on
other bills that session to deal with other civil rights issues that the Civil Rights Act

would not cover. Id. An employment rights bill predecessor to the UADA was one such
bill under consideration, and that passed, in that same 1965 session to fill in gaps left by
the Utah Civil Rights Act See H.B. 62 (1965): House Debate. 1965.57* Day. Record 2.
Given the above, the intent of the legislature clearly was that the Utah Civil
Rights Act only apply to ensure customers equal, nondiscriminatory access to goods and
services. The legislature would not have passed the predecessor bill to the UADA the
same session it passed the Civil Rights Act if it intended for the Civil Rights Act to cover
discrimination in employment. The fact that the legislature saw a need to adopt a specific
employment rights bill the same session it passed the Civil Rights Act. and a fortiori the
fact that it saw a need to adopt the UADA four years later.5 illustrates that the legislature
simply did not intend the Utah Civil Rights Act to apply to employment The legislature
certainly did not state any such intent in the language of the Civil Rights Act Rather,
the legislature has consciously and deliberately adopted a wholly separate set of statutes
specifically to deal with employment discrimination-the UADA. Therefore, the Utah
Civil Rights Act cannot provide a clear and substantial public policy relating to
employment because both its language and its legislative history clearly show that it does
noL and was not intended to. apply to employment at all.6

;

See e.g.. "Histon '* section under the UADA. Utah Code .Ann. § 34A-5-101.
indicating the U.ADA was originally enacted in 1969 and original!} codified at 34-55-1
et sea., then re-numbered to its present numbers.
The federal public accommodations act also bears upon this issue and supports
this interpretation of the Utah Civil Rights Act. The Utah Civil Rights Act was created
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b.

The district court's reliance upon the Utah Civil Rights Act
as the basis for creating the New Tort violaied established
canons of statutory construction and potentially eviscerates
the entire UADA system

As shown above, both the language of the statute itself and its legislative
history plainly show the Utah Civil Rights Act is not. an employment statute and so does
not, and indeed cannot under this Court's decisions requiring clearly established
substantial and narrowly tailored policy bases for wrongful termination of employment
tort claims, have any bearing upon this case. Whatever policy it establishes outside the
employment arena, the Utah Civil Rights Act simply has no application to and does not
establish any policy with respect to employment rights which are instead governed by the
UADA that is specifically designed to deal with employment. The district court's
reliance on the general Civil Rights Act as the basis for creation of the claimed New Tort

:o provide a state equivalent of the federal accommodations statute, and its language
tracks that of the federal act. Utah State House of Representatives. Floor Dehaie on
Senate Bill 44. February 4. 1965. 25th Day. Record 4. Side 1 at 12-20. 26: compare 42
U.S.C. ; 2000a (2001) with Utah Code .Ann. §§ 13-"-1 and 13-7-3. Indeed, during the
rloor debate of the first version of the UADA. the legislators repeatedly referred to the
Utah C:\il Rights Act as the '"public accommodations act." Utah State House of
Representatives. Floor Debate on House Bill 62. March 6. 1965. 5~r- Day. Side 2 at 2-3.
In several places throughout the legislative record of the federal accommodations act.
upon which Utah's parallel Civil Rights Act is premised, supporters and opponents alike
acknowledge that it applies only to ensure customers' access to "hotels, motels, theaters
and other places of amusement presenting sources of entertainment which move in
interstate commerce, and restaurants, lunch counters and gas stations which seii food or
goods which move in commerce or which serve interstate travelers." H.R. Rep. No. S8oi j , ;0<u>. reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355. 2395-9". 2410-11. 2434-35. 2442.
2494-^5.
^7

to the exclusion of the UADA violates the canon of statutory construction that "a more
specific statute governs instead of a more general statute." Jensen v. 1HC Hospitals. Inc..
944 P.2d 327.331 (Utah 1997): State v. VigiL 842 P.2d 843.845 (Utah 1992) (-specific
statutory provisions take precedence over general staiutory provisions.""). Even if the
Civil Rights Act was arguably broad enough to encompass employment rights, which it
is not as a matter of law its application must yield to the UADA that is specifically an
employment rights statute. The UADA therefore, including its small employer
exemption, must govern this case, not the Utah Civil Rights Act The district court's
application of the general Civil Rights Act instead of the UADA and its small employer
exemption, therefore, was reversible error.
This Court should also reverse the district court's decision because
construing the Utah Civil Rights Act as providing the basis for a tort action for wrongful
termination of employment creates a loophole around the UADA rendering the UADA
meaningless for large employers as well as for small employers. Virtually every
empio>ment discrimination case based on a claim of sexual discrimination would be tiled
in court based in tort rather than be confined to the administrative procedures and limits
established by the UADA. See e.g., Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277. 282 (Utah 2000)
i rejecting novel interpretation of statute in light of the well-settled principle of statutory
construction that "any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperaiive
or superfluous is to be avoided"): State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311.312 (Utah 19951 (samei.
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The UADA is specifically and expressly designed to deal with employment
discrimination claims, and includes a detailed system for doing so. Part of that system
includes legislative policy determinations and definitions of which claims simply are not
cognizable, such as those against small employers like P.R. Incorporated. Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-5-102(8XaXiv) (Supp. 2001). Other parts of that system include
establishing statutes of limitation for asserting discrimination claims (180 days from the
alleged discrimination) and providing an administrative body and procedure for handling
claims. Id §§ 34A-5-107(l) & (3) to (10). There are also legislative policy
determinations as to the extent of the relief that is available for claims that are proven
(reinstatement back pay. benefits, and attorney fees). Id. § 34A-5-107(9). The district
court's determination that there is a tort cause of action for the types of discrimination
dealt with by the UADA. however, neuters the UADA. What claimant would not rather
have a four-year tort statute of limitations in which to assert a claim instead of the 180
da\ s to file a claim under the UADA? And what claimant would not rather have the
potential to recover large ton general compensator} and even punitive damage awards
instead of the potential of only reinstatement (to a job presumably they would be
uncomfortable at given prior discriminator} treatment and legal proceedings), back pay
and back benefits under the U.ADA? Unless UADA's preemption in the area of
emplo>ment discrimination law is upheld and enforced including its small employer
exemption provision, the entire UADA system will disappear as plaintiffs seek the
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greater gains of a tort action (the settlement of which could always get them what they
would get under the UADA. but with the potential to gain much more) against both large
and small employers alike. There is nothing in the district court's opinion that would,
nor is there any way rationally to. limit the New Tort to small employers only: nor would
it be a well-considered policy choice to open small employers to the ravages of extensive
tort litigation and damages while leaving large employers protected by the safeguards
and limited relief of the UADA. Such a sweeping shift in longstanding employment lawshould not be undertaken lightly, and certainly should not be based upon the Civil Rights
Act which is not even an employment-related statute.
2.

The Executive Orders Relied Upon by the District Court on Their
Face Expressly Do Not Apply to the Case at Bar. and As a Matter of
Law Could Not Create a Public Policy Applicable to this Case in
Any Event

This Court should reverse the district court's decision because the
executive orders of Utah's governors relied upon by the district court (copies of all of
which are attached hereto as Addendum No. "). on their face each expressly apply only
to employment within the state government. Plaintiff, however, was not employed by.
nor has she sued, the state government. Thus, the cited executive orders are not narrowly
tailored to the Plaintiffs claims alleged in the case at bar and do not create any clear and
substantial public policy applicable to support creation of the claimed New Ton against
small employers in the private sector. See e.g.. Burton. 2000 I T 1 8 . r 13. 994 P.2d at
1266 (rejecting cited statute and administrative rule as possible bases for age
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discrimination tort noting they expressly appiied oniy to employment practices of the
state itself and parties contracting with the state, and that they therefore "obviously
[have] no application to a private employer) (emphasis in original).
Moreover, even if they purported to. wiiich in this case they do not
executive orders as a matter of law cannot create public policy for the private sector. By
stating the executive orders provide a public policy applicable to private sector
employers, the district court in effect held the governor can make law. Constitutional
separation of powers principles, however, clearly vest law making authority exclusively
with the legislature. It is axiomatic thaL "[tjhe executive branch simply has no power to
make the law: that power rests exclusively with [the legislative branch].~ YoungstoMn
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer\ 343 U.S. 579. 587 (1952). Executive orders purporting to
regulate the private sector are constitutionally invalid. Id. (invalidating an executive
order purporting to affect privately owned businesses). Thus, even if the language of any
of the executive orders attempted to reach into and regulate or otherwise set policy for
the pn\ate sector (which on their face they do not), those executive orders would be
constitutionally invalid. Sening policy for the private sector is the sole prerogative of the
legislature and thus the executive orders cannot provide any basis for the creation of the
claimed New Ton against small private sector employers.
The only thing at all significant about the cited executive orders is that the
Utah Legislature has adopted and held to its policy oi non-applicability of discrimination
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law to small employers in the face of those executive orders. The cited executive orders
date back to 1965. That is the same year the legislature adopted the UADA. including its
small employer exemption. Notwithstanding various governors issuing the other 9 cited
executive orders over the 36 years since then, the Utah Legislature has several times
amended various aspects of the UADA but has always maintained the small employer
exemption, this confirms unequivocally that the cited executive orders do not set public
policy for the private sector and therefore do not support Plaintiffs claimed New Tort
3.

Title VII Cannot Serve as the Basis for Any Clear and Substantial
Public Policy Actionable Against Small Employers Because it Too
Expressly Exempts Small Employers

The district court's reliance upon Title VII as a basis for creating a New
Tort cause of action against small employers in circumvention of the UADA small
employer exemption is wholly misplaced because Title VII (a copy of which is attached
included in Addendum No. 8 hereto) has a 15 employee threshold for liability and
exempts small employers just like the UADA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e<bn2000). Thus, on
its face. Title VII does not reflect any public policy narrowly tailored to proscribe
discrimination by small employers. To the contrary, the 15 emplo>ee liability threshold
on its face, as well as both the legislative history of Title VII and federal case law
interpreting iL confirm that the policy intended and reflected by Title VII is not.to impose
liabiiiry upon small emplo\ers. but to insulate them from it. See 110 CONG. REC. 13.08588 (June 9. 1964) (legislative history of Title VII showing policy is not to impose

.
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liability upon small employers): Tomaka v. Seller Corp.. 66 F.3d 1295.1314 <2d Cir.
1995) (recognizing Title VIFs small employer exemption and its legislative history
indicating it is intended for "the protection of intimate and personal relations existing in
small business**): Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc.. 991 F.2d 583. 587 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated
with litigating discrimination claims'*). Indeed, this Court in Burton cited both of the
above two federal cases under Title VH as persuasive authority confirming this Court"s
recognition that the UADA exempts and preempts small employers from liability for
claims such as the one brought in this case. 2000 UT 1 8 . r 16. 994 P.2d at 1267. The
district court's reliance upon Title VII is contran* to the language, legislative history*, and
interpreting cases of that federal act. including this Court's Burton decision. Title VII
simply and clearly does not support the existence of a narrowly tailored, clear and
substantial public policy applicable to small employers. Indeed, it is antithetical to such a
claimed polic> since it expressly exempts small emplo>ers from liability just like the
UADA. and thus cannot suppon the creation of a New Ton cause of action against small
employ ers.

B.

None of the Other Citations Relied Upon by Plaintiff Can Support
Creation of the Claimed New Tort in Circumvention of the UADA Nor
Otherwise Create an Applicable Public Policy That Could Support
Creation of the New Tort Against Small Employers Such As P.R.
Incorporated
Plaintiff raised a litany of sources in addition to the above-referenced

sourcesreliedupon by the district court in an attempt to identify a possible source of
public policy to support the creation of the New Tort. None of those other purported
authorities, however, are applicable, relevant, or sufficient to met the required test of
clear, substantial, and narrowly-tailored to apply to small employers, and thus may not be
relied upon as the foundation for the claimed New Tort. It is more fully explained below
why each of the Plaintiffs other citations may not be relied upon as the basis for creating
the claimed New Tort.
1.

Utah Constitution. Art. I §§ 1 and 24

Article I. sections 1 and 24 of the Utah Constitution < copies of which are in
Addendum No. 4 hereto) are not narrowly tailored to create any clear and substantial
public policy with respect to employment, particularly in the private sector, and thus are
inapplicable to this employment law case. Although Article I. section 1 sets forth certain
"inherent and inalienable"rightsthat the government may not infringe upon, none of
them are employment rights, and P.R. Incorporated is not the government. That section,
therefore, is inapplicable to this case. Moreover, this Court has rejected .Article I. section
1 as a possible basis for a claim of wrongful termination of employment in \ iolation of
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public policy, explaining that section simply does not "enunciate the narrow type of
policy envisioned by our case law creating the public policy exception." Rackley v.
Fainiew Care Centers. 2001 UT 3 2 . r 20.23 P.3d 1022. 1028 (2001).
Article I. section 24 also has nothing to do with employment, so it cannot
creaie any clear and substantial public policy applicable to this case either. .Article I.
section 24 states, ~[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." This
Court long ago held this to mean that the government cannot create and enforce laws on
the basis of improper classifications. See e.g.. State v. Mason. 94 Utah 501. "8 P.2d 920
119411. This section does not create any employment rights or policies, and thus is
simply inapplicable to this case and cannot serve as the basis for any clear, substantial, or
narrowr> -tailored employment-related public policy upon which the creation of the NewTon must be premised.
2.

Utah Code §§76-10-1302

Utah Code §§ 76-10-1302 (a copy of which is included in Addendum No.
5 hereto) is Utah's criminal prostitution statute. This statute does not establish a clear
and substantial public policy with respect to small employers running legal businesses
unrelated to prostitution such as P.R. Incorporated*s carburetor shop and is completely
and ratently inapplicable to this case where Plaintiff was not i and is not even alleged to
have heem tired for anything relating in any way to prostitution.

3.

Utah Code § 26-8A-501

Utah Code § 26-8a-501 (a copy of which is included in Addendum No. 5
hereto) does not establish a clear and substantial public policy with respect to
employment since this statute has nothing to do with employment at all. Section 26-8A501 provides. ~[n]o person licensed, certified, or designated pursuant to this chapter may
discriminate in the provision of emergency medical services on the basis of race. sex.
color, creed, or prior inquiry as to ability to pay.*" (Emphasis added). Clearly, on its face
the statute expressly deals only with discrimination in the ••provision of emergency
medicai services." It provides, for example, that ambulance drivers may not leave
someone lying injured in the street due to the person's race. sex. color, creed, or ability to
pay. It manifestly has absolutely nothing to do with employment in any way. including
not even employment of emergency medical personnel. Since this statute does not deal
with emplo>ment at all. it does not and cannot provide any clear and substantial public
polic> narrowly tailored to employment law. and thus is no support for creation of the
claimed New Tort.
4.

Utah Code § 11-25-12

Utah Code § 11-25-12 (a copy of which is included in Addendum No. 5
hereto) does not establish a clear and substantial public policy applicable to this case
because on its face the statute applies only to municipal government agencies and not to
prhate emplo>ers such as P.R. Incorporated. Section 11-25-12 stales. "[t]he a£enc\ shall
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require that any residence which is rehabilitated with financing obtained under this pan
shall.... be open... to all regardless o f . . . sex/* (Emphasis added). On its face, this
stamte has nothing to do with employment and only applies to and governs certain
government agencies. Since the statute has nothing to do with small private sector
employers, it cannot sene as a clear and substantial public policy narrowly tailored to
apply to situations such as the one at issue in the case at bar. and thus cannot sene as any
basis for creation of the claimed New Tort. See Burton, 2000 UT 1 8 , c 13.994 P.2d at
1266 rWhile arguably a public policy can be found in [cited] statute and Code, it
obviously** applies only to employment practices of the state itself and parties contracting
with the state, and thus "obviously has no application to a private employer.~) (emphasis
in original).
5.

Utah Code §§ 57-21-3. -5. -6. & -7

Utah Code §§ 57-21-3. -5. -6. & -7 (copies of which are included in
Addendum No. 5 hereto I are sections of the Utah Fair Housing Act. None of these
sections, nor any other portion of the Fair Housing ACL create any clear and substantial
public policy narrowly tailored to employment because the Fair Housing Act clearly and
expressly applies only to housing. E.g., id. § 57-21-5 & -7 (both stating the Fair Housing
Act is intended to provide relief from "discriminatory housing practices") < emphasis
added >. Clearly, then, the Utah Fair Housing Act does not create a clear and substantial
public policy narrowly tailored to employment rights, and thus cannot provide the basis
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for the New TOIL

6.

Administrative Code Sections

None of the administrative code sections cited by Plaintiff (copies of all of
which are included in Addendum No. 6 hereto) on their face do. nor can they as a matter
of law. create a clear and substantial public policy applicable to this case. All but one of
those sections are wholly inapplicable to this case because they do not deal with
employment at all. The section that does deal with employment (R994-405-107) merely
states that sexual discrimination "is prohibited by Title VII of the United States Code and
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. It does not add to or otherwise elaborate on whai is
said in those statutes. Thus, rather than creating any public policy, this section merely
refers one to Title VII and the UADA both of which expressly exempt small employers
like P.R- Incorporated from claims such as the one issue in this case. Moreover, this
Court has held that administrative code provisions may not be relied upon as a basis for
public policy claims. This court stated that as a maner of law,~(a]dministrative
regulations by their verv nature are not "substantial" under our case law/* and thus may
not be relied upon as bases for a wrongful termination tort claim. Rackley v. Fairview
Care Centers. 2001 UT 3 2 . c 27. 23 P.3d 1022. 1029 (2001) (emphasis added).
Although this Court added that administrative regulations may "provide support to a
legislatively or judicially created public policy." 2001 UT 32. n.8. 23 P.3d at 1030 n.8.
(emphasis added), none of the administrative code sections Plaintiff cites support a
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public policy basis applicable to this case that would provide any foundation for the
claimed New Tort, because there simph are none. The Utah Legislature passed only one
statute regulating sex discrimination in employment, the UADA. The UADA expressly
exempts and excepts from liability small private-sector employers with fewer than 15
employees, such a P.R. Incorporated. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-102(8XaXivi (Supp.
2001). This Court's decision in Burton confirmed that statutory exemption. 2000 LT
1 8 . c c 12.13.994 P.2d at 1265-66. Thus, the cited adniinistrative code sections
themselves cannot create any public policy that could serve as the foundation for the
New Ton. and there is no statutory or case authority that could provide such foundation
that the administrative code sections could even support.
7.

Federal Statutes and Regulations

In addition to the above. Plaintiff attempted to rely upon several federal
statutes and regulations to support Plaintiffs claimed New Ton. As a matter of law.
hou e\ er. federal statutes and regulations cannot support creating the claimed New Tort
because this Court has held that only a violation of "the clear and substantial public
poiic} of the State of Utah" may give rise to a claim for wrongful termination in violation
of the public policy of this state. Peterson v Browning. 832 P.2d 1280. 1283 (Utah
199211 explaining that even if any federal or other state's law were violated, that does not
necessarih provide the basis for an action under the public policy claim in Utah)
• emphasis added). Thus, as a matter of law. no federal statute or regulation may be relied
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upon to create a basis for the New Tort against small employers in Utah.
Moreover, each of the Plaintiffs cited federal statutes (copies of all of
which are included in Addendum No. 8 hereto) and regulations (copies of all of which
are included in Addendum No. 9 hereto) are facially inapplicable to this case and
ineffective to create the claimed New Tort in any event. To begin with. Title 2 U.S.C.
section 1311 and Title 3 U.S.C. section 411 expressly apply only to the employment
practices of the Congress and the President respectively. Accordingly, they "obviously
[have] no application to a private employer" and thus have no application to the case at
bar. See Bunon. 2000 UT 18. r 13. 994 P.2d at 1266 (rejecting as possible basis for tort
against private employers a cited statute and administrative rule regulating employment
practices of the state itself and parties contracting with the state) (emphasis in original).
Therefore, these sections are not narrowly tailored to and do not create any clear and
substantial policy applicable to any private sector employers, much less specifically to
am smail pmate sector emplo\ers like P.R. Incorporated, and thus ma> not be the
foundation for creation of the claimed New Tort against small privaie sector employers.
Title 29 U.S.C. section 206(d) is not narrowly tailored to the situation ai
issue in this case and does not present clear and substantial public polic>. This statute
express!) cieais not with termination of emplo\ees. which is at issue in this case, but onh
with pa\ment of equal wages to men and women who perform equal work. That section
stales: "No emplo>er... shall discnminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex b>
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paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work..."
The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that the policy of section 206(d) comes
into play onlv when it can be shown that the employer pays different w ages to employees
of opposite sexes who perform equal work. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan. 417 U.S.
188.195 (1974). Accordingly, federal courts have recognized that section 206(d) simply
does not apply to employment/personnel decisions. Eg., Marshall v. Magnavox Co. of
Tennessee. 494 F.Supp. 1.6 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (noting section 206(d) does not prohibit
hiring employees purely on the basis of sex), affd. Kithoui opinion. 627 F.2d 1089 (6th
Cir. 1980). Since section 206(d) only applies to equal pay for equal work and does not
apply to claims dealing with employment decisions, it is inapplicable to this case.
Title 42 U.S.C. section 5057 also has nothing to do with small, private
emplo\ers. That section expressly applies only to prohibit discrimination b> a "volunteer
organization" that receives financial assistance from the federal government. 42 U.S.C.
§ 505"(aH 1) (2001) (emphasis added). Since P.R. Incorporated is not such an
organization, it is not covered by section 505 7 . According!}. ±at statute, and any policy
embodied within it. is inapplicable to this case, and certainly is not a clear and substantial
statement of policy narrowly tailored to apply to small private emplo\ers such as P.R.
Incorporated as is necessary for creation of the claimed New Ton. See Biirwn. 2000 LT
18. r 13. 994 P.2d at 1266 (rejecting as the basis for a ton action against small employers
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generally an administrative code section prohibiting discrimination by employers
contacting with the state, explaining ~[w]hile arguably a public policy can be found... it
obviously has no application to a private employer.**! (emphasis in original).
None of the federal regulations cited by Plaintiff (copies of all of which are
included in Addendum No. 9 hereto) create or reflect any narrowly tailored, clear and
substantial public policy applicable to small private-sector employers. Each of the
regulations upon which Plaintiff has attempted to rely expressly deal exclusively with
either the employment practices of the federal government itself or of businesses who
contract with the federal government. They simply do not apply to employment practices
of private sector employers and so cannot be relied upon as the narrowly tailored basis
for any claimed clear and substantial public policy applicable to small private sector
employers. See Burton. 2000 UT 18. r 13.994 P.2d at 1266 (holding statute and
administrative provisions dealing with employment by state and parties contracting with
the state "obviously has no application to a private employer") (emphasis in original).
II.

EVEN IF THE CLAIMED NEW TORT COULD EXIST L\ UTAH.
WHICH IT CANNOT, IT WOULD NOT BE COGNIZABLE
AGAINST KELLY PETERSON PERSONALLY SINCE HE DID
NOT PERSONALLY EMPLOY PLAINTIFF AND THEREFORE
WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE DUTIES UPON WHICH THE NEW
TORT IS DEPENDENT
This Coun should reverse the district court's decision on the issue of

personal liability for the claimed New Tort and order that this case be dismissed as
against Kelh Peterson personally. Even if the claimed New Ton could exist in Utah.

which it cannot as discussed above, as a matter of law it could not be asserted against
Keih Peterson personally because he did not personally employ Plaintiff and so was not
personally subject to the duties upon which the tort of wrongful termination of
employment is premised. The uniform rule throughout the country is that "supervisors
cannot be held personally liable for employment discrimination" such as that claimed by
the Plaintiff in this case. Reno v. Baird. 957 P.2d 1333.1337 (Cal. 1998). Plaintiffs
claim against Kelly Peterson personally therefore fails as a matter of law. The district
court erred in holding Kelly Peterson could be personally liable for the New Tort- and
this Court should reverse that ruling.
The claimed New Tort Plaintiff alleges in this case is for wrongful
termination of employment in violation of public policy. By definition wrongful
termination of employment requires there be an employer-emplovee relationship between
;he riaintitf and the defendant. The duty to manage a business in accordance with public
poiic>. the violation of which Plaintiff argues should create tort liability, "arises
necessanh from the relationship between an employer and an emplo> ee.~ Phillips v.
Gc >i:n: Moving Specialists. ~4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29. 3^ (Cal. CL App. 19981 Accordingly.
[TJhird parties cannot commit the tort of wrongful discharge in violation ol
public polic\ because they are not subject to the duty on which the ton is
based. [Id. (holding managerial employee ""did not commit the ton oi
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because the ton has its
basis in the employer-employee relationship and [managerial employee!
was not plaintiffs employer. Thus, plaintiff can have no cause of action
against [managerial employee] for wrongful termination.")].

Thus, only an employer may be liable for a wrongful termination:
supervisory or managerial employees, including those involved directly in the
termination, are not employers and so cannot be held personally liable for a wrongful
teirnination. Eg., Burk v. K-Mart Corp.. 770 ?2d 24.28 (Okla. 1989) (only emploveis
may commit a wrongful termination); Vigil v. Arzola. 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. CL App.
1983). rev don other grounds. 687 P.2d 613 (KM. 1983) (same); Reno, 957 P2d at
1347-48 (same).
This claimed New Tort is different from other torts that can occur between
any two people. It is not like an automobile accident, for example, that can occur
between two completely unrelated strangers. Wrongful termination implies and flows
from an employment relationship. Without there being an employer-employee
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, there simply can be no tortious
wrongful termination of employment.
.As a matter of law. Kelly Peterson cannot be personally liable for the NewTon because he indisputably did not have an employer-employee relationship with
Plaintiff. The overwhelming, undisputed evidence below shows that Kellv Peterson was
not Plaintiffs emplover. Plaintiff was hired and employed by P.R. Incorporated, not bv
Kelly Peterson personally. Plaintiff worked for P.R. Incorporated. not_Kelly Peterson
personal!). Plaintiff was paid b\ P.R. Incorporated, not. Kelly Peterson personally. All
actions alleged to have been taken by Kelly Peterson were taken in his capacity as a
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supervisory employee of P.R. Incorporated and not. in his personal capacity. Simply put
Plaintiffs entire employment relationship was with P.R. Incorporated noLwith Kelly
Peterson personally. Kelly Peterson, therefore, cannot be held personally liable for the
claimed New Tort since he personally had no employment relationship with the Plaintiff
upon which New Tort depends, and he did not personally discharge Plaintiff in his
individual capacity (nor could he since he did not employ her).7
This case presents the very paradigm of why individual liability has been
denied on claims such as these. Kelly Peterson personally has been required to spend
thousands of dollars in his defense in this action under the threat of compensator}*,
general and punitive damages on a claim which by definition and as a matter of law is
not cognizable against him personally. In explaining why personal liability on wrongful
termination claims is inappropriate, courts have stressed the need to avoid these exact

Furthermore, holding an individual supervisor or agent personally liable under
the claimed New ton \ iolates the intent of the Utah State Legislature. .As this Court
recognized in Burton, the intent of the legislature in passing the U.ADA was to protect
small employers from the burden of defending discrimination claims. 994 P.2d at 1266.
Given that intent, "it is inconceivable that [the legislature] intended to allow civil liability
to run against individual employees." Haynes v. Williams. 88 F.3d 898. 901 I 10~ Cir.
1996) quoting Sauers v. Salt Lake County. 1 F.3d 1122. 1125 (10r Cir. 1993) (holding
that "Under Title VII. suits against individuals must proceed in their official capacity:
individual capacity suits are inappropriate."): see also Reno. 957 P.2d at 1348 (stating
since plaintiff could not sue an individual supervisor under the California version of the
U.ADA, the plaintiff may not sue in tort). Therefore, because Plaintiffs employment
relationship was with P.R. Incorporated, not with Kelly Peterson personally, and because
of the U.ADA" s legislative intent, as a matter of law any New Ton of wrongful
termination of emplo\ment is not cognizable against Kelly Peterson.
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and grievous problems:
Adding individual supervisors personally as defendants adds mostly an in
terrorem quality to the litigation, threatening individual supervisory
employees with the spectre of financial ruin for themselves and their
families and correspondingly enhancing a plaintiffs possibility of
extracting a settlement on a basis on other than the merits. [Reno. 957 P2d
at 1341 (citing Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 72-76)].
By holding that a supervisor can be personally liable for wrongful
termination, this Court would create a conflict of interest between supervisors and small
employers. If supervisors could be held personalty liable, then even time a supervisor in
a small business makes a personnel decision, that supervisor would be putting his house,
retirement, bank accounts and children's college education in jeopard) because even if
the supervisor made the decision for legitimate business reasons, the disgruntled
employee may still force the supervisor to defend against a wrongful termination action
in court Since small employers do not have the benefit of a free administrative procedure
like large employers do. even if the supervisor prevails in court the victory will come at
an incredible personal expense to the individual supervisor. Because of the high costs of
litigation, a supervisor may opt to settle to avoid litigation costs even though his decision
was wholly based on legitimate business reasons.
Thus, a conflict of interest is created between the supervisor and employer
because with the threat of financial ruin looming over every personnel decision a
supervisor makes, the supervisor will no longer do what is in the best interest of the
business, but rather what is in his/her best interest to avoid a lawsuit Hence, by creating
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this conflict of interest, even' business is pumsheo regardless of its conduct because the
empkwer no longer has the loyalty of the supervisor since the supervisor.
Furthermore, if there were fifteen or more employees in the business, as an
exclusive remedy. Plaintiffs claims would have been initially handled administrate ery at
minimal expense (to the business and not to Kelly Peterson personally) and with oniy
exposure for recover}- of lost income, back pay and attorneys* fees. Further, this lawsuit
has caused significant disruption in the business of P.R. Incorporated and has caused
significant disruption of personal relationships with the employees at P.R. Incorporated.
Plaintiffs lawsuit against Kelh Peterson personal"} is precise!} the type of an anempt to
extract a quick settlement on a basis other than the merits that the courts ha\ e proscribed.
Therefore, as a matter of law and public policy. Kelh Peterson simply cannot and should
not be held personal"} liable for any tort of wrongful termination of emplo}ment.
According!). this Court should order this case be dismissed as against Kelh Peterson
personaih.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURTS ORDER IMPERMISSIBLY EXCEEDS
THE SCOPE OF ITS OPINION
Rule 4-504( 1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration states that

courts" orders must be "in conformit} with the ruling" of the court on the matter at issue.
Thai rule was \iolated in this case, since the district court's Opinion express!} granted
Plaintiffs Motion onh with respect to two of the four affirmative defenses Plaintiff
attacked and express!} resen ed ruling on the other rwo attacked arfirmath e defenses

(relating to personal liability), but the Order drafted by Plaintiff and entered by the Court,
over Defendants" timely objection, granted Plaintiffs Motion without limitation of any
kind, thus apparently eliminating all four of the affirmative defenses attacked by
Plaintiff including the personal liability defenses. Also, the Order's apparent elimination
of the affirmative defenses of personal liability in granting Plaintiffs Motion is internally
inconsistent with that portion of the Order expressly reserving ruling on Defendants"
Motion as h pertained to personal liability pending further discover}-, which is how the
district court in fact ruled in its Opinion.
As shown above, as a matter of law Kelly Peterson may not be held directly
personally liable for the claimed New Tort, and this case therefore should be dismissed as
against him without waiting the time and enduring the cost and effort of discovery as
against him. At a very minimum, this Court should order the district court's Order be
amended to conform to its Opinion that preserved the availability of the personal liability
defenses pending further discovery.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the district court's decision and hold that the
claimed New Tort does not exist in Utah as a matter of law. Claims such as the New
Ton are statutorily preempted by the UADA. particularly as against employers like P.R.
Incorporated with fewer than 15 employees whom the legislature, through the UADA.
express!} exempted and excepted from such claims. Creation of a New Ton in this
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preempted area is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature, and none of the authorities
cited by the Plaintiff nor relied upon by the district court provide a clear and substantial
public policy statement narrowly tailored to apply to small employers as would be
necessary under this Court's precedent to create a New Tort for wrongful termination of
employment in derogation of the UADA and Utah's long-standing ~at-wilT employment
doctrine. This Court therefore, should hold the claimed New Tort does not exist in
Utah, and order this case be dismissed outright
Moreover, even if the New Tort could exist in Utah, which as a matter of
law it cannot by definition Defendant-Appellant Kelly Peterson may not be held
personally liable since he did not personally emplov Plaintiff and thus legally cannot be
personally liable for any claimed wrongful termination of employment This Court
therefore, should order this case be dismissed as against Kelly Peterson personally.
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